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Abstract
In the study of institutionalization in authoritarian regimes, the cryptic anti-
corruption institutions active in non-democratic governance are often under-
studied. This is largely due to the opaque intra-regime disciplinary inspection 
process associated with extralegal detentions, as well as the sub-rosa nature of 
corruption activities. Through research on the institutional implications of Xi 
Jinping's ongoing anti-corruption campaign, a vital effort for his power con-
solidation, this article aims to explain the 'authoritarian resilience' of the Com-
munist Party of China (CPC). Based on analysis of the evolution of the CPC's 
anti-corruption effort in the reform era, focused on the comparison of Xi Jinping 
and Hu Jintao's respective anti-corruption drives and of institutional ﬂaws in 
the CPC bureaucracy that stoke high-stakes corruption, the article discusses 
different institutional imperatives that the top leadership needs to address in a 
range of political contexts. It also assesses the extent to which the new methods 
adopted by Xi's graft-busters have been effective in addressing these challenges. 
Keywords:  authoritarianism, China, corruption, Leninist, Xi Jinping
Introduction
There have been frequent scholarly efforts to provide detailed assess-
ment of the effectiveness of China's anti-corruption agencies and cam-
paigns (Manion 2004; Wedeman 2012; Quah 2013;1 Guo 2014). However, 
not enough attention has been paid to the recent dynamics of Xi Jinping's 
anti-corruption campaign since he became the paramount leader in 
2012, and its institutional implications for the governance of the Party-
state.2 Since some international scholars, with a pessimistic view of the 
CPC's governance, use widespread corruption and the entrenchment of 
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predatory ofﬁcials as key evidence of CPC's atrophy (gradual decline) 
(Shambaugh 2012: 11-12), the study of Xi's unprecedented anti-corrup-
tion movement helps to provide clues for the answer of the question as 
to whether the CPC is capable of managing the intractable corruption 
problem through signiﬁcant re-institutionalization efforts or, in Andrew 
Nathan's words, whether the CPC is displaying 'authoritarian resilience' 
on this issue (2003: 6-17).
Since the Tiananmen crackdown of 1989, it is generally believed that 
corruption has worsened in China (Ash 2013; Quah 2013; Chen 2009; 
Yang 2004: 1; Root 1996). Earlier records revealed that mostly low and 
mid-level corruptive ofﬁcials had been exposed and punished, but these 
days high-level and high-stakes cases (da'an yao'an) are on the rise.3 Some 
have deemed China's corruption as being systematized and embedded 
in the system of state capitalism (Root 1996; The Economist 2002;4 Fenby 
2012: 7-8). Comparing corruption in China and India, Ash argues that 
'while the Indian system is a daily soap opera of small crises, the big 
crisis of China's self-contradictory system of Leninist capitalism is yet to 
come' (2013: 48). According to the global Corruption Perceptions Index 
(CPI), compiled by Transparency International (2017),5 China ranked 
seventy-ninth in terms of cleanness among 176 countries in 2016: the 
same as India and Brazil. Between 2008 and 2012, the second term of 
Xi's predecessor Hu Jintao, China's CPI score ﬂuctuated between thirty-
ﬁfth and thirty-ninth, while in Xi's ﬁrst term between 2013 and 2017, it 
reached fortieth position (Table 1), showing a slightly improved anti-
corruption situation thanks to Xi's clean-up effort. Nevertheless, even 
the unprecedented war against corruption has failed to raise China's 
CPI ranking substantially, indicating the public's increasing concern 
over the fairness and transparency of the anti-corruption campaign itself 
in an opaque authoritarian system that lacks democratic elections, an 
independent judiciary system or sufﬁcient media supervision.6 
The study of institutionalization in authoritarian regimes, which takes 
seriously previously neglected institutional pillars of non-democratic 
governance, has been revived to explain adaptive initiatives undertaken 
by resilient authoritarian rulers in coping with chronic governance chal-
lenges (Schedler 2009). Current scholarship has touched upon many 
aspects of the CPC's re-institutionalization endeavour for adaptation 
and co-optation purposes, which includes the professionalization of 
the civil service (Brodsgaard 2002), rebuilding of Party cells (Pieke 
2009), the experiment of 'intra-Party democracy' (Li 2009; Zheng 2012) 
and regular career cadre training in Party schools (Shambaugh 2008). 
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However, analysis of Xi Jinping's overhaul of anti-corruption institu-
tions, as well as its effectiveness in maintaining the CPC's 'authoritarian 
resilience' (Nathan 2003; Heilmann and Perry 2011; Shambaugh 2012: 
8-22; Wang and Tan 2013: 199) in the face of bureaucratic fragmenta-
tion and citizen activism, is a ﬁeld yet to be ploughed. In the shadow 
of the Arab Spring that toppled a string of entrenched dictatorships in 
North Africa, the CPC's central authority has been facing unprecedented 
challenges from societal forces and vested interests within the regime 
in the anti-corruption realm, with its credibility and legitimacy being 
overtly damaged by frequent graft and sex scandals in the age of social 
media.  Based on analysis of the evolution of the CPC's anti-corruption 
effort in the reform era, with focus on the comparison of Xi Jinping and 
Hu Jintao's anti-corruption drives, and of institutional ﬂaws in the CPC 
bureaucracy that stoke high-stakes corruption, this article discusses 
different institutional imperatives or fundamental challenges that the 
top leadership needs to address in a completely new political and socio-
economic context characterized by social media and civic activism. It 
also asks to what extent the re-institutionalization in Xi's anti-corruption 
movement has been effective in addressing these challenges.
Runaway Corruption before Xi Came to Power 
Corruption is not a new phenomenon in the history of the People's Re-
public, which is often explained as being due to the lack of an independ-
ent judiciary system and media supervision. After 30 years of gradual 
economic reform, the Party-state's partially marketized economy has 
become a hotbed for more high-stake and high-level corruption cases. 
TABLE 1. China's ranks and scores in the Corruption Perception Index* 
by Transparency International (2008 - 2016)
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
China's  
ranking 72 79 78 75 80 80 100 83 79
No. of 
countries 
surveyed
180 180 178 183 174 177 174 167 176
China's 
scores** 36 36 35 36 39 40 36 37 40
* The annual Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), ﬁrst released in 1995, is the best known of 
Transparency International's tools. The CPI ranks countries by their perceived levels of corrup-
tion, as determined by expert assessments and opinion surveys.
** A country or territory's score indicates the perceived level of public sector corruption on a scale 
of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean). 
_________________________________________________________________________33
______________________ Reinforcing Leninist Means of Corruption Control in China
Despite three decades of economic liberalization, the state has not with-
drawn from the economy, which is still securely under the control of state 
sectors and strongly inﬂuenced by government policies. China's rapid 
marketization process since 1992 has opened up more opportunities for 
rent-seeking activities. Large state-owned enterprises, public service 
organizations and local governments have become corruption-prone
In the 1980s, local governments were granted a certain degree of ﬁscal 
autonomy including the putting up of independent budget expenditures 
and sharing of budget revenues as proposed by the central govern-
ment. The administrative decentralization of the 1980s and 1990s had 
changed ﬁscal central-local relations, vesting more power over funds 
and resources on local governments and inevitably offering local ofﬁcials 
more opportunities for corruption. The 1994 tax-sharing system (TSS) 
reform7 recentralized Beijing's economic management power by increas-
ing its role in ﬁscal redistribution among provinces, while giving local 
governments the jurisdiction to collect business tax, urban land-use tax, 
house property tax, land value-added tax and some other taxes relating 
to local development as local revenues (Su and Zhao 2014).8 
The new tax system after 1994 incentivized local governments to 
put much emphasis on developing urban construction and real estate, 
acquiring land from farmers at low cost and selling it at high prices and 
sharing the proﬁt made with developers (Wang and Li 2007: 39). Given 
the fact that the GDP index is still the most important criterion for the 
promotion of local ofﬁcials, developing real estate and infrastructure in 
the process of urbanization is one of the most effective ways for local gov-
ernments to boost the local economy. Local land transaction and credit 
markets have become hotbeds for corruption in China. Ofﬁcials make 
the rules and arbitrate the land game. The government maintains tight 
control over most investment projects through the issuing of long-term 
bank credit and granting of land-use rights.9 Local ofﬁcials are granted 
the authority to regulate access to markets, investment funds, foreign 
investment and trade, and so on, and to redistribute ﬁscal beneﬁts and 
burdens. Given these powers to interfere in business, local ofﬁcials have 
ample room for rent-seeking activities. 
Besides local ofﬁcials' monopolistic and discretionary powers over 
budgets, resources and investment decisions, they also have authority 
over the judicial system through the political-legal committees (zheng-
fawei) and the selection of personnel through the nomenklatura system 
(Bergsten et al 2008: 99). Judicial corruption cases and scandals about the 
selling of ofﬁcial posts have been exposed from time to time. Sectors such 
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as energy, ﬁnancial services, transportation, telecommunications, tobacco, 
iron, steel and non-ferrous metal, where state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
are either monopolists or dominant players, are breeding grounds for 
bribery, embezzlement, squandering and other rent-seeking activities. The 
government-granted monopoly or oligopoly has helped key SOEs reap 
massive after-tax proﬁts, which remain mostly in the coffers of the SOEs 
rather than ﬂowing into the public purse in the form of dividends.  
Owning monopolistic power and vast assets, large SOEs act like 
'independent kingdoms,' with their leaders usually nominated by CPC 
organization departments and enjoying higher (or equal) administrative 
ranks than local judicial and Party disciplinary ofﬁcials. Heads of many 
centrally controlled SOEs are vice-ministerial/provincial-level ofﬁcials, 
with a few at the ministerial level, such as the presidents of Sinopec Corp, 
China National Petroleum Corp, and China National Nuclear Corpora-
tion (CNNC). Only the Central Disciplinary Inspection Commission, with 
approval from the Politburo, is empowered to investigate and detain 
leaders of giant SOEs. Currently there is no effective means to supervise 
government management of state-owned assets, and no report on state-
owned assets is required during the annual parliamentary session of the 
National People's Congress for deliberation and discussion.
Almost all top political leaders have family members with substantial 
stakes in the corporate world (The Straits Times 2009: A28).10 The family 
of former premier Li Peng, for example, controls the country's power 
sector. The family of former Chinese president Jiang Zemin has moved 
into telecommunications, while the offspring of former premier Zhu 
Rongji are prominent players in banking. 
The runaway corruption was spurred by the government-directed 
stimulus of RMB 4 trillion (US$ 586 million) during the global ﬁnancial 
crisis aimed at funding massive infrastructure projects and subsidizing 
industries. While the Keynesian mega-stimulus has revitalized China's 
economy and salvaged numerous jobs in the aftermath of the crisis, it 
also fostered state cronyism and corruption as projects of all types were 
allocated top down, from the state to provinces, to cities, and ultimately 
to companies.
Since 2009, investment by state-controlled companies has skyrocketed, 
driven by hundreds of billions of dollars of government spending and 
state bank lending to combat the global economic downturn. The gov-
ernment had invested RMB2 trillion in the construction of high-speed 
railways alone since 2008, a sum which proved too attractive to former 
Minister of Railways Liu Zhijun and many of his colleagues who were 
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subsequently indicted for one of the largest chain corruption cases in 
the history of the People's Republic. Global leading luxury brands such 
as Compagnie Financière Richemont SA, the owner of Cartier; Swatch 
Group, the owner of Omega; LVMH, the owner of LV brands; and PPR, 
the owner of Gucci and Bottega Veneta, have beneﬁtted handsomely 
from the stimulus package and corrupt economy in China, witnessing 
20-30 per cent sales growth year on year in Greater China from 2009 to 
2012.11 Discretionary spending by Chinese high-rollers, including many 
corrupt ofﬁcials, has since 2009 powered Macau's gambling sector, the 
only place in China where casino gambling is legal, to a new height of 
13.5 per cent to a record US$ 38 billion in 2012. Macau's casino revenue, 
two-thirds of which was contributed by afﬂuent Chinese, soared 58 per 
cent and 42 per cent in 2010 and 2011 respectively.12 
  Despite the proliferation of corrupt activities, the number of ofﬁcials 
under procuratorial investigations each year did not grow correspond-
ingly during Hu Jintao's second term (2008-2012) (Figure 1). Besides the 
stimulus package, a number of other factors have catalysed corruption 
in China. These include the one-party authoritarian system that lacks an 
independent judiciary system and opposition parties; media censorship; a 
relatively low level of economic and social development; a vast area and 
large population governed by multi-layer regimes; and fast institutional 
changes during the reform and open-door process that have created nu-
merous policy loopholes and ambiguities. Globalization and urbanization 
also make it more difﬁcult to detect commercial corruption in its covert 
forms. The sub-rosa nature of corruption has made the monitoring of the 
corruption rate difﬁcult. Not only is there a possibility of false reporting, 
ofﬁcial data also only measure the revealed rate of malfeasance, not the 
actual rate of malfeasance. The revealed cases may shed light on changes 
in the real corruption rate, or may be a result of intensiﬁed anti-corrup-
tion efforts. To some, it may seem obvious that corruption has intensiﬁed 
because of larger payoffs in revealed cases. One cause is China's huge 
economic scale today, with rapid appreciation of state assets such as land, 
SOE equities and franchise rights in the hands of the government sectors.
Almost all the crimes involving ministerial ofﬁcials and those at pro-
vincial-level or above are high-stakes corruption cases running into 
tens of millions of yuan; many will not take such risks if it is not worth 
their while. Many ofﬁcials come up with ever more imaginative ways 
to gain wealth, like setting up private foundations or offshore accounts 
to accept bribes, encouraging entrepreneurs and companies to bankroll 
their children's education overseas, and obtaining pre-IPO stocks (Inter-
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national Herald Tribune 2009: 16).13 In the 1980s or 1990s, most cases only 
identiﬁed one or a couple of ofﬁcials as corrupt; today, corruption cases 
involve dozens of corrupt ofﬁcials in different departments or localities. 
Assessing the Party's Leninist Means of Corruption 
Control 
Maintaining Party discipline and improving cadre management are 
vital issues for a Leninist party to stay in power. Due to lack of political 
pressure from opposition parties or institutionalized supervision from 
civic organizations, the ruling CPC has to check graft activities among 
its cadres through repetitive 'party building' processes and intra-Party 
supervisory mechanisms. 
The Chinese system of discipline inspection was imported from Russia 
during the CPC's founding years. The CPC's discipline inspection was 
institutionalised in 1927 when the party established the disciplinary su-
pervisory commissions at the central and provincial levels (Gong 2008: 
141). When the People's Republic of China was founded in 1949, the CPC 
Central Committee issued 'the Decision on Establishing the Party's Dis-
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cipline Inspection Commissions at the Central and Other Levels' which 
led to the subsequent establishment of the CCDI (Central Commission 
for Discipline Inspection) (The CCDI 2014: 1). In March 1955, the CPC 
approved 'the Decision on Establishing the Party's Supervision Commis-
sions at Central and Other Levels' and established the Party's central and 
local supervision commissions to replace the Party's discipline inspection 
commissions at all levels. During the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), 
the Ninth Party Congress in 1969 adopted a new Party Constitution, 
which removed the articles concerning the Party's supervision organs, 
hence dissolving the Central Supervision Commission (The CCDI 2014: 
1). When the system of discipline inspection was dismantled, the Party 
was confronted with such thorny problems as ideological disorientation 
and moral decay among its members.
The Party's commissions for discipline inspection at all levels were 
reinstalled after the Third Plenum of the 11th CPC Central Committee 
elected the new CCDI in December 1978. In the reform era, the CCDI, 
which is by no means less important than before, has to constantly 
self-adapt and acclimatise itself to complex Party-state and state-mar-
ket relations. In September 1982, the 12th Party Congress adopted 
another motion that stipulates the election of the Party's commissions 
for discipline inspection at all levels by the Party Congresses at their 
corresponding levels. In January 1993, the CPC Central Committee 
and the State Council decided to merge the Party's CCDI with the State 
Council's Ministry of Supervision. This gave rise to a 'one agency, two 
names' format and the responsibilities of Party discipline inspection 
and administrative supervision (CCDI 2014: 1). 
Since the merger, the CCDI has signiﬁcantly enhanced its capability 
in supervising the intricate administrative apparatus and regulating 
daily social and economic activities at all levels. A deputy director of 
the CCDI now concurrently holds the post of Minister of Supervision 
in the State Council, China's Cabinet. The CPC has been strengthening 
and reforming its discipline inspection system in the transition from 
a command economy to a market economy, where the need for sup-
pressing moral degeneration and corruption of party members has to 
be urgently addressed. The reform of the discipline inspection system 
reveals the party leadership's awareness of its organisational problems 
and its willingness to ﬁght corruption through institutional building. 
The CPC's anti-corruption apparatus is a hierarchical system of 
discipline inspection commissions (DICs) that run parallel to party 
committees at every administrative level from the centre down to 
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counties (Gong 2008: 144). DICs are Party watchdogs that help guard 
against power abuse by high-ranking Party members and ensure the 
implementation of the Party lines, policies and resolutions. At the top 
level, the CCDI had 27 departments with a staff strength of approxi-
mately 1,000 by the end of 2014 (CCDI 2014: 5). These departments 
include the General Ofﬁce, Ofﬁce of Inspection Tour, Party Committee, 
departments of organisation, publicity, research, laws and regulations, 
supervision on party and government ethics, complaints, case supervi-
sion and management, case review, internal supervision, international 
cooperation (Ofﬁce for National Bureau of Corruption Prevention), 
logistics and retired cadres, and 12 departments of discipline inspec-
tion charged with anti-corruption missions in various regions and 
Party/administrative systems (Table 2).   
TABLE 2. Division of work among the 12 discipline inspection  
departments in the CCDI 
Serial Number of  
Discipline Inspection  
Department
Anti-corruption Focus
1st Department 
Organisations directly under the CPC Central 
Committee, and those in political, legal and pub-
licity ﬁelds
2nd Department Organisations under the State Council
3rd Department Organisations under the State Council
4th Department Financial institutions
5th Department
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administra-
tion Commission (SASAC) and companies directly 
under the control of SASAC
6th Department Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei and Shanxi
7th Department Shanghai, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian and Jiangxi
8th Department
Hunan, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan, liaison of-
ﬁces in Hong Kong and Macau
9th Department
Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang and the 
Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps.
10th Department Inner Mongolia, Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang
11th Department Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan and Tibet
12th Department Jiangsu, Shandong, Henan and Hubei
Source: CCDI (2014: 7-8).
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FIGURE 2.  CPC discipline inspection apparatus before 2013
refers to leadership relationship
Source: prepared by the author.
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In recent years, the CCDI has paid more attention to tip-offs from 
ordinary Party members and the public, with its website portal open to 
the public for the ﬁrst time in September 2013. The tip-offs are sent to the 
Departments of Complaints under the CCDI through correspondence, 
posting on the CCDI website, paying visits to special reception venues 
set up by discipline inspection organs or calling its hotline (CCDI 2014: 
13). The discipline inspection departments that handle the reports are re-
quired to send the outcomes of the investigations to the whistle blowers. 
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Under China's one-party political system, it is the CCDI and its local 
branches rather than the procuratorate or the police that start the inves-
tigations and detain suspects who are Party members. The discipline 
inspection commissions, established at provincial, municipal, county 
and even township levels, have long time been under the dual leader-
ship of local Party bosses and the discipline inspection commissions at 
a higher level (Figure 2). 
Before 2013, it was the local Party committee or government, not the 
higher disciplinary inspection apparatus, that provided local discipli-
nary inspectors with details of their annual budgetary funds, approved 
cadre promotions, determined manpower planning and even allocated 
resources such as cars, ofﬁce buildings and employee housing. The 
disciplinary inspectors at local levels thus had difﬁculty overseeing 
malfeasance at their peer level. Only the CCDI, with the approval of 
the Politburo, has been empowered to investigate and detain provincial 
and ministerial ofﬁcials or leaders of giant SOEs. Besides, local Party 
ofﬁcials had authority over the judicial system through the local politi-
cal-legal committees (zhengfawei) and the nomenklatura system. Judicial 
corruption cases and selling-ofﬁcial-post scandals have been exposed 
from time to time.
A motley collection of organizations at various levels, including the 
CPC's disciplinary inspection departments, the judiciary, the procura-
torate, the auditing ofﬁces, and banking/securities/insurance super-
vision departments from the administration, are participating in the 
crackdown on graft. Such internal pluralism has forestalled a profes-
sional anti-corruption organ from taking full responsibility in the area, 
causing low efﬁciency and poor coordination in many cases.
The CCDI has also frequently intervened in judicial work by initiating 
and leading anti-corruption investigations. By doing so, the independ-
ence of the judiciary is severely undermined. The involvement of the 
CCDI in anti-corruption often helps some Party members, particularly 
high-ranking ofﬁcials, escape from criminal justice. This practice is 
therefore 'entirely arbitrary,' and has shown that it is 'improbable that 
China will move towards a depoliticized legal system as long as the Party 
treats its own members without reference to any legal process' (Becker 
2000: 340). It should also be noted that the CCDI and the Ministry of 
Supervision within the State Council share a joint ofﬁce: i.e. two differ-
ent ofﬁcial names, but one working team since January 1993. Therefore, 
there is no real boundary between the Party and the government in the 
anti-corruption realm.
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Institutional Changes in Xi's Anti-corruption Campaign
Chinese leaders have tended to embark on anti-corruption campaigns 
in their ﬁrst year of ofﬁce in order to court the public and consolidate 
power. Xi Jinping's anti-corruption campaign is no exception; the excep-
tion is in the scale and intensity of the crackdown compared to similar 
political house-cleaning executed by his two predecessors, Jiang Zemin 
and Hu Jintao, in the reform era. The investigation and detainment of 
Zhou Yongkang, the Party's security czar, along with a large number 
of his family members, relatives, and protégés, broke the immunity of 
Politburo Standing Committee members from any corruption charges. 
This immunity has been an informal rule in Chinese elite politics in the 
past two decades.  
Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong, two retired vice-chairmen of the Central 
Military Commission and Politburo members, were expelled from the 
Party for alleged corruption.  Ling Jihua and Su Rong, two vice Chair-
men of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CP-
PCC), were the highest-ranking incumbent ofﬁcials nabbed in Xi's ﬁrst 
term. Zhou Yongkang was not only monetarily corrupt, but politically 
over-ambitious. His downfall was the second chapter of the 'Bo Xilai 
Drama,' in which charismatic Bo, supported by Zhou, was sacked due 
to his wife's murder scandal in the run-up to the 18th Party Congress 
in 2012. Behind-the-scenes jockeying for power and horse-trading had 
been extremely intense before the ﬁfth-generation leadership power 
transition; Xi Jinping ﬁnally managed to establish his supreme author-
ity through controlling both the Party and military command. Xi's 
crackdown on Zhou, a protégé of retired party patriarch Jiang Zemin 
and Zeng Qinghong, is politically risky. Jiang was general secretary of 
the CPC between 1989 and 2002 and he managed to retain his political 
inﬂuence until 2012 by putting many of his surrogates in key positions 
at the 18th Party Congress. Zeng, who has close ties with Jiang, was 
reportedly playing a vital role in establishing Xi's heir-apparent status 
in 2007. All these point to the huge difﬁculty in handling Zhou's case.
An unprecedented number of ofﬁcials at vice-ministerial level and 
above have been investigated or detained under corruption charges 
since Xi came to power. Between November 2012 and May 2017, about 
200 cadres of ministerial/provincial-level or above were investigated by 
the CPC's disciplinary inspection departments (South China Morning 
Post 2017).14 In comparison, the average number of ofﬁcals at vice-min-
isterial and above investigated in Hu Jintao's second term (2008-2012) 
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only reached six per annum (The People's Daily 2013: 2).15 The sharp 
increase in the number of 'tigers' reﬂected a multifaceted picture of Xi 
and Wang's anti-corruption campaign, which showcased not only the 
effectiveness of the crackdown but also the severity of the corruption 
situation even under Xi's reign and the intensity of intra-Party power 
struggle. This complexity was highlighted in July 2017 by the unexpected 
probe of Chongqing Party Secretary Sun Zhengcai, once a frontrunner 
in the 25-seat Politburo on track to ascend to the Standing Committee 
at the 19th Party Congress. The downfall of Sun indicated that corrup-
tion in Chongqing Municipality may have worsened after the removal 
of Bo Xilai in 2012, and that institutionalization of the CPC leadership 
succession has been disrupted by Xi's anti-corruption campaign. 
Despite the fact that anti-corruption campaigns are always reﬂective of 
intensiﬁed political struggles within the CPC, Xi has been a game-chang-
er in the CPC's anti-corruption record as his populist move against elite 
corruption is not only massive in scale, but also constitutes an important 
part of the Party's effort to reinforce Leninist control for maintaining 
legitimacy and authority. In the ﬁrst few years of their tenure, Jiang 
Zemin and Hu Jintao had launched house-cleaning operations against 
corrupt senior ofﬁcials like ex-Beijing Party Secretary Chen Xitong and 
ex-Shanghai Party Secretary Chen Liangyu in order to consolidate their 
power. However, their anti-corruption drives hardly made institutional 
contributions to the Party's disciplinary inspection frameworks, subsid-
ing ﬁnally when a new balance of power had been struck. 
Inspired by ancient China's imperial envoys (qinchai dachen) sent by 
emperors to oversee local ofﬁcials, Xi and Wang Qishan, head of the 
CCDI, dispatched inspection teams (xunshizu) led by ministerial-level 
ofﬁcials holding sinecure positions to corruption-prone provinces, state 
corporations and public service organizations. The inspection teams 
were stationed in these places for two months to uncover local grafts 
and their contact information publicized to seek public tip-offs. Xi and 
Wang sent the ﬁrst batch of inspection teams to various localities in 
May 2013. Five months later, the second batch of inspection teams, 
headed by different ofﬁcials, were sent to another ten places for graft 
investigation (Table 3). 
The teams provided feedback to the inspection bodies and alerted 
the CPC CCDI about signs of possible corruption. The inspections 
teams found rampant corruption in places like Shanxi province, Hunan 
province, Guizhou province, Jiangxi province, China Grain Reserves 
Corporation, Renmin University and the Three Gorges Corporation. 
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One of the highest-proﬁle corruption cases revealed by inspection teams 
was an electoral fraud scandal in Hunan province involving more than 
500 municipal lawmakers who had to step down and 56 representatives 
TABLE 3. First two batches of anti-corruption inspection teams (2013)
Serial Number 
of Inspection 
Team
Place of Inspection
(First Batch, May-July)
Place of Inspection
(Second Batch, October-
December)
No. 1
China Grain Reserves  
Corporation
Ministry of Commerce
No. 2 Hubei province Xinhua News Agency
No. 3 Ministry of Water Resources
Ministry of Land and 
Resources
No. 4 Inner Mongolia Jilin province
No. 5 Chongqing city Yunnan province
No. 6 Guizhou province Shanxi province
No. 7
China Publishing Group  
Corporation
Anhui province
No. 8 Jiangxi province Guangdong province
No. 9
The Export-Import Bank of 
China
Three Gorges Corporation
No. 10 Renmin University of China Hunan province
Source: Xinhua News Agency
of the Hunan People's Congress who were dismissed for being elected 
through bribery. An initial investigation revealed that 110 million yuan 
(US$ 18.1m) was offered as bribes to lawmakers and staff in the prov-
ince's second city of Hengyang. Tong Mingqian, former vice chairman 
of the People's Political Consultative Conference of Hunan province, 
was sacked and probed for graft thereafter.
The top leadership has realized that China's pervasive corruption is to 
some extent related to institutional ﬂaws within the CPC bureaucracy. 
China's special judicial system, dominated by the ruling party, keeps 
all anti-corruption investigations under wraps and makes manipula-
tion easy. In most cases, it is the local party committee or government, 
not the higher disciplinary inspection apparatus, that provides local 
disciplinary inspectors with details of their annual budgets, approves 
cadre promotions, determines manpower planning and even allocates 
resources such as cars, ofﬁce buildings and employee housing. Organi-
zations at various levels, including the CPC's disciplinary inspection 
departments, the judiciary, the procuratorate, the auditing ofﬁces, 
and the banking/securities/insurance supervision departments of the 
administration, participate in the crackdown on grafts. Such internal 
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pluralism has forestalled a professional anti-corruption organ from 
taking full responsibility for the area, thus causing low efﬁciency and 
poor coordination in many cases.
The disciplinary inspectors at local levels thus have difﬁculty oversee-
ing malfeasance at their peer level. Only the CCDI, with the approval 
of the Politburo, is empowered to investigate and detain provincial and 
ministerial ofﬁcials or leaders of giant state-owned enterprises. Besides, 
local party ofﬁcials have authority over the judicial system through 
the local political-legal committees (zhengfawei) and the nomenklatura 
system. Judicial corruption cases and selling-ofﬁcial-post scandals have 
been exposed from time to time. To enhance the authority of disciplinary 
inspection committees at various levels, the top leadership has decided 
to put them under the direct control of the upper-level disciplinary 
inspection committees, while weakening the leadership relationship 
between the Party committees and disciplinary inspection committees 
at the same level (Figure 3). Similar reforms have also been applied to 
judicial systems that include the courts and procuratorates at various 
levels to strengthen their independence and authority vis-à-vis local 
Party bosses.
On 11 February 2014, Premier Li Keqiang said the government would 
further open its budget and all its accounts to the public and urged top 
cadres to strengthen constraints on their relatives and staff (Today 2014: 
21).16 China's Budget Law, which took effect from 1995, does not speciﬁ-
cally require governments at various levels to release speciﬁc budgetary 
ﬁgures on ofﬁcials' spending on vehicles, banquets and overseas trips at 
public expenses, or the 'three public expenses' (sangong xiaofei). Soaring 
ﬁscal revenues in the past decade have however started to make head-
lines and pushed the central government since 2008 to pass a regulation 
on the information disclosure of the three expenses. In response to the 
demand for the opening of the government's account book to public 
scrutiny, China's State Council released a circular in November 2011 to 
request all governments above county-level to include the expenditure 
on cars, receptions and trips in their annual budget. The regulation re-
quired government departments to use medium- or low-end cars with 
reasonable maintenance costs for ofﬁcial purposes, set up guidelines for 
ofﬁcial receptions, and limit the number of overseas trips by ofﬁcials.
To further curb red tape and extravagance, Xi Jinping announced the 
Eight Directives (baxiang guiding) in December 2012,17 which required 
ofﬁcials to cut ofﬁcial meetings and trips as well as media expenses, traf-
ﬁc control and police escorts associated with them. In December 2013, 
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the CPC General Ofﬁce and State Council General Ofﬁce jointly issued 
the Six Injunctions (liuxiang jinling),18 banning almost all forms of gifts, 
banquets, receptions and tours at government expense in the celebration 
of the Chinese New Year. China has yet to meet best practices in budget 
transparency, which grants ordinary citizens and civil society organiza-
tions access to information about how public funds are allocated and 
used.19 Without political opposition and sufﬁcient media supervision, 
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the non-transparent budgets both at the central and local levels create 
opportunities for graft and misappropriation. Experts have urged for 
more transparent budgets from the government to ensure governance 
accountability and public surveillance. 
In recent years, public discontent with ofﬁcial corruption and malfea-
sance has spread when social media brought to light sex scandals and the 
extravagant lifestyles of cadres. The leadership under Xi seemingly wants 
to ride on this online anti-corruption trend to better oversee its gigantic 
ofﬁcialdom. State media like Xinhua and People's Daily have emphasized 
the role of public and social media in monitoring corruption.
In Xi's time, China has changed tactics in its global man-hunt for 
fugitives wanted at home for corruption, successfully repatriating a 
large number of corruption suspects as part of a wider crackdown on 
deep-rooted graft. In 2015, Assistant Foreign Minister Liu Jianchao was 
installed by Wang Qishan as director general for international coopera-
tion at the CCDI, a division of the anti-graft agency that oversees the 'Sky 
Net' and 'Operation Fox Hunt,' Xi's initiatives to repatriate corruption 
suspects. Liu admitted that the lack of extradition deals between China 
and many western countries had hampered the country's effort in getting 
suspected corrupt ofﬁcials and assets from overseas. He revealed that the 
'Sky Net,' once an operation led by the Ministry of Public Security under 
the State Council, had been merged with 'Operation Fox Hunt' to become 
part of the CCDI's mission in Xi's time.20  Such institutional change has 
enhanced the CCDI's authority over other anti-graft departments, im-
proving efﬁciency through curbing bureaucratic fragmentation. China's 
international pursuit of corruption suspects resulted in the repatriation 
of over 2,500 former ofﬁcials from about 90 countries between 2014 and 
2017.21 Some of the fugitives, like Yang Xiuzhu, a former senior construc-
tion ofﬁcial in eastern Zhejiang province, had stayed abroad for more 
than ten years before repatriation. Thanks to 'Sky Net' and 'Operation Fox 
Hunt,' the number of graft suspects that ﬂed to other countries dropped 
from 101 in 2014 to 19 in 2016 (Xinhua News 2017).22  
Xi's Anti-Corruption Crusade: Further Evidence of the 
CPC's 'Authoritarian Resilience'?
In the study of institutionalization in authoritarian regimes, repressive 
institutional pillars like the cryptic anti-graft apparatus in the non-
democratic governance are often understudied. Through the research 
on Xi's anti-corruption campaign accompanied by the Party-state's 
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re-institutionalization of its disciplinary inspection system, this article 
aimed to contribute to the growing body of institutionalist studies of au-
thoritarianism that help to explain the CPC's 'authoritarian resilience'.23 
Based on analysis of institutional and practical changes brought by Xi 
and Wang to China's anti-corruption drive, the article discusses different 
institutional imperatives or fundamental challenges the authoritarian 
leaders needed to address before and after the 18th Party Congress in 
2012, and to what extent the re-institutionalization has been effective 
in addressing these challenges. Xi's unprecedented anti-corruption 
campaign will continue to affect China's political and economic trajec-
tory profoundly in the next few years. Politically, Xi's nascent power 
has been ﬁrmly consolidated, with key members in the rivalling Zhou 
Yongkang's camp being purged under corruption charges and Xi's 
popularity boosted among the public for his crackdown on corrupt 
cadres and ofﬁcial overspending. 
Economically, China's galloping economic growth has been deceler-
ated by such harsh anti-graft and austerity measures. Local ofﬁcials' 
appetites in promoting GDP and ﬁscal revenues, which have been in-
centivized by the 1994 tax-sharing system (TSS) reform and rent-seeking 
activities under CPC's acquiescence thereafter, are now being impaired 
by Xi's anti-corruption movements. While the anti-corruption campaign 
may bring down overall GDP growth, it will have the positive impact 
of rectifying the asymmetry between strong government consumption 
and weak household consumption. Suppliers of luxurious products 
and services targeted at well-heeled ofﬁcials have been hit hard by Xi's 
austerity measures, while companies and restaurants on the other side 
of the spectrum are thriving in the new context. 
Corruption poses serious threat to the image and legitimacy of the 
new leadership under Xi, who has to prevent the escalation of large-scale 
corruption in order to regain public support. Nevertheless, uprooting 
corruption is mission impossible in the current political, economic and 
social context, and Chinese leaders fully understand the limits of anti-
corruption actions. High-proﬁle corruption cases like Zhou Yongkang's 
and Bo Xilai's may be interpreted as the outgrowth of power struggles 
within the CPC, with competing factions using the 'war on corruption' as 
a tool to eliminate or weaken rivals and their corporate supporters. The 
new leadership is expected to taper the scale of anti-corruption movement 
once it has consolidated its power and established full authority. 
Although western observers often criticize China's anti-corruption 
work as ineffective and superﬁcial, the CPC's long-time adherence 
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to high-handed actions with multi-dimensional means does prevent 
corruption from being a fatal threat to the Party's rule or the country's 
economic growth. Punishing big timers severely is also an efﬁcient way 
of redistributing wealth in the context of exacerbating social inequali-
ties. In the long run, to win in a full-scale war on corruption, China has 
to gradually institutionalize an independent judiciary system with an 
enhanced supervisory role for the media and public. Catching the 'tigers' 
alone is not enough to make the regime more accountable, transparent 
and responsive. Selective enforcement in a politicized process would 
only lead to more corruption and undermine the effectiveness of anti-
corruption campaigns. 
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